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TERRORISM: THE PERSISTENT DILEMMA OF LEGITIMACY*

M CherifBassiounit
I am honored to join such a distinguished group of experts in
discussing a topic of significant contemporary relevance. My appreciation
goes to Professor Michael Scharf, and to the Frederick Cox Center for
hosting this conference, and for inviting me to deliver the keynote address.
Precisely because there are so many experts present at this conference,
I would like to confine myself to a few eclectic and provocative questions
as a way of contributing to the debate.
At an international conference held at the International Institute of
Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences, in Siracusa, Italy in 1973, I coined the
phrase "what is terrorism to some is heroism to others."' Though the
maxim may seem banal, it represents the contrasting legitimacy-based
views of those who resort to violence as a way of accomplishing a poweroutcome.
The issue of legitimacy of use of force has existed for as far back as
organized societies have existed. For some there is in it the echo of Niccolo
Machiavelli, that the ends justify the means, and that violence is only one of
the means. For others, surely since the emergence of what constitutes just
and unjust resort to violence in civilizations such as Greece and Rome,
there is a moral dimension that limits both jus ad bellum and jus in bello.
As of the nineteenth century, political realists see legitimacy as a reflection
of the asymmetry of power between competing groups seeking to justify as
their means by focusing on the ends. No matter what the debate is about, it
is always those with dominant power who control the characterization of
their opponents' violence. This is what led Mao Tse Tung to say in his Red
Book, that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun.

* Keynote Address for the War Crimes Research Symposium: "Terrorism on Trial" at
Case Western Reserve University School of Law, sponsored by the Frederick K. Cox
International Law Center, on Friday, Oct. 8, 2004.
1 Distinguished Research Professor of Law, President, International Human Rights Law
Institute, DePaul University College of Law; President, International Institute of Higher
Studies in Criminal Sciences (Siracusa, Italy); Honorary President, International Association
of Penal Law (Paris, France).
For the proceedings of the conference, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM AND POLITICAL CRIMES (1975).
2 Mao Tse Tung, Problems of War and Strategy, in 2 MAO TSE TUNG, SELECTED WORKS
224 (1938).
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For centuries, the international community has sought to develop
neutral rules in times of war which preclude the use of certain forms of
violence and certain weapons by establishing boundaries designed to
protect certain persons and certain targets.3 However, the neutrality of
these rules have also historically favored the more powerful, leaving those
with less power few alternatives to their violation. This explains why since
WWII the largest quantum of victimization occurred during conflicts of a
non-international character.
Consider also that international law's failure to provide effective
mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts has all too frequently
left protagonists with no other option but to resort to violence and, because
of the power-asymmetry factor, to transgress the rules on the limits to
violence. President Kennedy, at a meeting of heads of states in the
Americas in 1961 eloquently described the issue as, "those who make
peaceful revolution impossible make violent revolution inevitable." Thus,
without effective mechanisms of peaceful resolution of conflicts, and
without the rule of law equally applicable to all protagonists, the alternative
is violence-and more often than not, violence in violations of international
humanitarian law and human rights law, which falls within the meaning of
terrorism.
For States, it has always been easier to advocate self-defense and
legitimacy, while for aggrieved groups, the same claims are more difficult
to make. A good example is the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, where no
matter what the violent action is, when performed by Israel it is legitimate,
though with admission of possible excessive use of force in isolated cases,
while when performed by the Palestinians, it is almost always terrorism.
The resort to forms of violence that instill terror in a given population
has been a constant feature of history. The rhetoric of contemporary
politicians notwithstanding, terrorism, as we have now come to call it, is
not new, and neither are responses thereto. Tyrannical regimes throughout
history have resorted to terror-violence, from Ghengis Khan in the Middle
Ages to the Nazi and Stalinist regimes in modern times. Most revolutions
have also been accompanied by a reign of terror such as during the French,
Leninist, and Maoist revolutions, to name only a few. How do we
characterize the Spanish Inquisition? States, groups, organized religion,
revolutionaries, zealots, and individuals with all sorts of causes have
resorted to terror-violence with all sorts of justifications. 4 Yet, we seem to
periodically re-discover the phenomenon and reinvent responses to it.
What remains constant are the competing claims of legitimacy, even when
3 See A MANUAL
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AGREEMENTS (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 2000).
4 See INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS (1937-2001) (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 2001); 1, 2 INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF U.N. DOcUMENTS

(1972-2001) (M. CherifBassiouni ed., 2002).
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the actions of its claimant are of the same type as those claimed to be
"terrorists."
In more recent times, ethnic, religious and political conflicts have also
brought their share of terror-violence to different societies all over the
world. Since the end of WWII, in almost every region in the world, there
have been conflicts characterized by terror-violence. It seems like ddj& vu,
even when the means and consequences have not been previously
experienced.
What distinguishes these different experiences is the ability of certain
societies to restrain themselves in counter-terrorism measures, and to avoid
engaging in the same tactics of those who oppose them. In the last forty
years, Europe in particular has gone through these experiences with the Red
Brigades in Italy, the Baader-Meinhof group in Germany, the Basque
separatist movement in Spain, and the IRA in Ireland, to name only a few.
In all of these cases, the governments in question have avoided resorting to
terror-violence as a way of quelling the terrorism inflicted upon their
societies by rebellious groups, irrespective of the validity of any of these
groups' claims. More importantly, these governments have sought to
restrain their violent responses in the exercise of their legitimate rights of
defending their societies by making sure that the costs to freedom and
democracy would not be so high as to hand the rebellious groups a victory
over governmental legitimacy.
Older civilizations seem to have a better historic memory, and a
greater appreciation of the value of hard-earned civil liberties. Newer
civilizations tend to think more of security over liberty and short-term over
long-term. In that context, it is relevant to recall the words of Benjamin
Franklin during America's war of independence, that "they that can give up
essential liberty to obtain a little temporary safety deserve neither liberty
nor safety."
The perception of terrorist threats in all societies depends on a variety
of factors, one of which is context, and the other is the way in which
governments project threats and their assessments to their population.
When some governments enhance the threats, they predispose their
societies to greater fear, and thus condition them to accept measures which
in and of themselves contravene fundamental social values, erode civil
liberties, and curtail human rights. When that occurs, the loss to society is
sometimes greater than the threats they may face. In those cases, the
"terrorists" win a moral victory, only because these governments lost the
high moral ground.
Some societies may have a lower threshold of vulnerability to the
socio-psychological impact of terror-violence because they come to it with
historic baggage that magnifies collective fear, and thus increases that
5 See INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: LEGAL CHALLENGES AND
Association Task Force on International Terrorism, 2003).
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society's perception of vulnerability. In these situations, individual acts of
terrorism operate as a psychological trigger recall mechanism which bring
to the fore the harms suffered by that society in the past. For example,
Palestinian suicide bombing in Israel has a much greater sociopsychological impact than for example in Iraq, because of the history of the
Jewish peoples' vulnerability throughout their 2,000 year history.
The psychological significance of terrorism is also largely dependent
on a society's perception of vulnerability, as well as on how a given
government may heighten that perception. In these cases, quantitative or
comparative analysis of harm lose their significance. 9/11 is such a case. It
resulted in approximately 3,600 deaths. However, in the United States,
there are approximately 25,000 persons killed every year as a result of
drunken driving, and 20,000 killed a year as a result of violent homicides.
Notwithstanding the extraordinary amount of casualties produced every
year in this country by criminal activities, the sense of vulnerability in
American society is not as acute as with respect to prospective acts of
terrorism.
Interestingly, few institutional changes have occurred over the years in
this country to prevent violent homicides and drunken driving homicides,
yet major institutional changes have occurred as a result of the single
incident that resulted in 3,600 people killed. Some may see that phenomena
as caused by the yearly recurrence of some 45,000 casualties to which we
have become accustomed, while we cannot accept the vulnerability of being
exposed to the unexpected attacks of foreign source terrorism. Others will
see it as the reaction of national pride. It is not so much the harm as the
offense. The point is that the quantum of harm brought about by criminal
behavior is not what shapes perceptions of threat, and reactions to its
occurrence. It is what we make of it, or rather what politicians and media
dissemination engenders in a given society at a given time. Objectivity has
nothing to do with perception, and that is one of the more intractable issues
in dealing with terrorism.
The randomness in terrorism heightens the sense of risk and the
perception of risk. The inability to control the source of violence heightens
the risk assessment. Consequently, it does not only become a question of
This includes the
numbers, it becomes a question of intangibles.
psychological impact of vulnerability on the one hand, and a lack of
predictability of the prospective harm on the other. In the area of ordinary
common crime, the responses are simpler: one does not go into certain
neighborhoods; one does not go into certain neighborhoods at certain times;
precautions can be taken. As a result, what one does can minimize the
risks, and therefore render the risk assessable. But there is no way that an
individual can make such an assessment when s/he gets on a plane and risks
a hijacking. Therefore, the vulnerability increases because the risk
assessment is imponderable. The need to respond to it, in a particular case,
becomes different than the need to respond to more predictable crimes.
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Nevertheless, the essential question is-what is the role of policy in making
certain that an appropriate balance is struck between risk and response?
Some lessons regarding responses to terrorism can be learned from
Europe's experience during the sixties and seventies. One of them is that
leaders should never heighten a society's fear and expectations of harm.
This does not mean forgoing any measures of prevention and control, but
when a leader increases the level of fear in society, s/he plays into the hands
of the terrorists, because s/he admits to the society's level of vulnerability,
and also enhances the standing of a terrorist group to the level of a
counterpart.
This is how Osama Bin Laden and al-Qaeda became
America's counterpart enemies. What an extraordinary recognition of
status to such a person and to such a group of people whose only merit is to
advocate violence, and on occasion to successfully carry it out. Such status
gives the person and the group the type of recognition and success that they
hope for. Worse yet, it is an incentive for similar groups to emulate them,
as in the case of Abu Musa AI-Zarqawi in Iraq, who before getting a Bin
Laden franchise, fell into a maverick category.
The last thing that a terrorist group wants is a governmental reaction
that downplays its importance because the very purpose of terror-violence
attacks is to create an imbalance in society that demonstrates its
vulnerability and disrupts normalcy. Accomplishing these purposes gives
the terrorist group status, negotiating ability, and the likelihood of obtaining
certain desired results. By overreacting, heightening fear levels, curtailing
civil liberties, and sometimes engaging in abuses, governments lose the
high moral ground in the struggle, and diminish their ability to engage in
effective prevention and control, and, ultimately, genuine suppression of
this type of activity.
Another political or operational lesson to be learned is that in
responding to terrorist events, governments should never engage
themselves at the highest level. In other words, when a terrorist event
occurs, it should be dealt with as a crime problem, and not by a declaration
of war against what is usually a small group or in the case of al-Qaeda, an
amorphous organization or network of groups and individuals. When
higher level of governments get involved, a political dimension is
introduced that can hardly be de-escalated from the heights of political
rhetoric to the level of a criminal activity to be dealt with effectively and
judiciously. This in no way should be interpreted as restricting the use of
all available means of lawful responses to protect, prevent, control, and
suppress terrorism. Nor is the reference to criminal activity intended to
denote that there is no room for a military and intelligence role. All the
forces of society should be marshaled to insure the goals of protection and
prevention. However, contemporary reactions to international terrorism
demonstrate that leaders have lost sight of these lessons with far greater
consequences to peace and security than could be imagined. Suffice it to
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recall that 9/11 led to wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the latter situation
speaks for itself, to Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib.
Considering the Pan Am 103 trial, to be discussed at this conference,
Professor Scharf argues that the trial was a great experience that
demonstrates how international criminal law can be imaginative and solve
political problems through legal inventiveness. I agree with him. The
solution to that international impasse shows that international criminal law
can be imaginative by shifting gears from national prosecutions or
extradition to a change of venue. The European Convention on Transfer of
Criminal Proceedings and the European Convention on Transfer of
Prisoners offer such solutions. There are a number of modalities in
international criminal law that are designed to allow the system to shift
gears in order to enhance accountability and diminish the opportunities for
impunity. To that extent, the Pan Am 103 trial in The Netherlands was a
success. However, was the trial intended to record history or to make sure
that history is not to be recorded? One hypothesis is that the trial was
designed to make sure that history would not be recorded because the
political interests of certain states were at stake.
Trials cannot always establish the truth or the full record of historic
events. 6 Sometimes they even alter the truth and distort the record. The
Eichmann case in Jerusalem was made to establish a historic record and it
succeeded. 7 Israel's Prime Minister Ben Gurion urged Chief Prosecutor
Gideon Hausner to establish the record of the Holocaust in a court of law
since it was not fully established during the Nuremburg trials. The
difficulty in such an effort is that a trial deals with a given individual-it
focuses on a given case. The individual case is like a tree in a forest, and if
you focus on the tree, you cannot see the forest. In the Eichmann case, the
prosecution made a tremendous effort to establish the entire record of
history of what occurred during the Holocaust. This effort was successful
because the focus of the trial was not limited to looking only at the
individual tree, thus it established a valid historic record.
On the other hand, Nuremberg was an extraordinary opportunity for
the USSR to change the record, even to distort it. The USSR wanted the
world to forget about the Molotov-Rippentrop Pact of Non-Aggression, the
agreement between Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia to split Poland into
two parts, dividing it between themselves. More specifically, the USSR
wanted to make certain that the 12,000 Polish officers they killed in the
Katyn Forest Massacre would be blamed on the Germans.8 So, the USSR
distorted the record at Nuremberg by condemning the German army for the
6 See STEPHAN LANDSMAN, CRIMES OF THE HOLOCAUST: THE LAW CONFRONTS HARD

CASES (2005).
7 Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, [1962] S.Ct. (Isr.).
8

See J.

K. ZAWODNY, DEATH IN THE FOREST: THE STORY OF THE KATYN FOREST

MASSACRE (1962).
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killing of 12,000 Polish officers that the Soviets killed. Nothing since then
has been done to correct that historic record.
What did the Pan Am 103 case add to the recordation of history on
combating terrorism? I submit nothing much.
The experts participating in today's conference know much more
about the Pan Am 103 case than I do, but why was there was a ten-year
stalemate in this matter? The stalemate came from the fact that the United
States and the United Kingdom wanted Libya to extradite the two accused
operatives, while Libya invoked its right to prosecute them under the 1971
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Civil Aviation. For over thirty years, the world's major powers never
sought to resolve the competing obligations' priorities of whether
prosecution or extradition comes first.
The language of the 1971 Montreal Convention is silent on whether
prosecution precedes extradition and whether prosecution has a priority
over extradition. The Convention's ambiguity is also evidenced by the
absence of two unarticulated premises, namely, that the prosecution must be
effective, not merely a sham, and that it must also be fair. Second, any
extradition must also be effective and not a hollow showing. Thus,
effectiveness and fairness are two unarticulated premises or conditions in
both the prosecution and the extradition that are absent in the Convention's
text. However, no treaty addresses effectiveness and fairness because
diplomats typically abstain from addressing such complicated questions. As
a result, the normative framework for pursuing justice for acts of
international terrorism has an inherent ambiguity. This inherent ambiguity
resulted in the United States and the United Kingdom arguing that Libya
would be ineffective in its prosecution of the accused, thus justifying
extradition to their respective countries to face effective prosecution. Libya
argued a lack of trust in the fairness of any prosecution in the requesting
states, and refused, citing the Convention's language to prosecute first. As
a result, a ten-year stalemate ensued, ultimately resolved by further
negotiations that lead to the Pan Am 103 trials. Even after Pan Am 103, the
problems still exists.
It is interesting to note that "terrorism" has never been defined. 9 For
over thirty years the United States government has opposed the adoption of
a comprehensive definition of terrorism.
The policies of several
administrations have been to define terrorism in a narrower sense. The
United States wanted a subject-matter or piecemeal approach, including
separate conventions on aircraft hijacking, kidnappings, the kidnapping of
diplomats, the use of explosives, terrorist financing, and nuclear terrorism.
As a result, since the adoption of the 1969 Tokyo Convention, there are
9 See A More Secured World. Our Shared Responsibility, Report of the SecretaryGeneral's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (2
December 2004).
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twelve international conventions dealing, sectorally, and having different
subjects. Additionally, there are three other unrelated conventions that deal
with the subject of terrorism, including the Geneva Convention on the Law
of the Sea and the IMO Convention that resulted from the seizure of the
Achille Lauro and the Klinghoffer murder. There are therefore a total of
fifteen conventions dealing with terrorism with different signatory states.
The language of these conventions is archaic and frequently ambiguous, but
diplomats continue to follow the same formula of prosecute or extradite
taken from the 1971 Montreal Convention. The result is ineffective
Moreover, the current framework of
international enforcement.
international law fails to integrate the several modalities of international
cooperation in penal matters to make the enforcement system more
There are no adequate policies of coordination at the
effective.
international level. Over sixty international bodies and agencies deal with
terrorism and confront terrorism in a piecemeal fashion. The Security
Council's Counter-Terrorism Committee has not been able to coordinate all
of these efforts. As a result, rather than developing a multilateral
cooperation framework, the current approach emphasizes bilateral efforts.
While this favors the United States who can wield "the big club"
against other States, there is a point of diminishing returns, and eventually
resentment against the United States become an impediment to cooperation.
Surely, when the United States resorts to kidnapping suspected terrorists
and torturing them or sending them to other countries to be tortured, it loses
legitimacy in the fight against terrorism. That is why "what is terrorism to
some is heroism to others." As George Santayana once said, "Those who
cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." 10 And we seem to
be repeating our past in dealing with "terrorism."

-10GEORGE SANTAYANA,

LiFE OF REASON (1905).

